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Abstract
This paper investigates how the possibility of government subsidies to Þrms aﬀects lending and man-
agerial incentives. We develop a model that shows that government support can perform as implicit
insurer of Þrms, which leads to two main eﬀects: lowering incentives of managers and increase of incen-
tives to Þnance. The equilibrium with government intervention can be more eﬃcient than one without
intervention. We test the model predictions on Russian enterprise-level panel data for 1996-2000. Empiri-
cal evidence supports two predictions: 1) the probability that a Þrm gets external Þnancing increases with
increase of governments care about Þrms survival; 2) Þrms with intermediate performance get subsidies.
1 Introduction
The economic decline in Russia in 1990s was one of the deepest and longest among all transition
economies. Diﬀerent explanations for this observation have been proposed: the size of the economy, the
high level of intervention of the government in the economy, inability to compete with the increased ßow of
import, and lack of human capital due to ineﬃcient mechanisms of central planning. As a result of distorting
planning most enterprises needed costly restructuring to survive in the market economy, but only a small part
of the economy had the necessary internal Þnancing. Moreover, managers of enterprises that had Þnancing
did not always have incentives to restructure due to moral hazard. In such a situation external Þnancing
was hardly proÞtable for lenders. Thus, prospects of restructuring faced two primary problems  lack of
managerial incentives and lack of access to capital.
The government played an important role in weakening the managerial incentives in transition. If the
government had pursued bankruptcy of all loss-making enterprises instead of bailing them out, a signiÞcant
part of the economy would have had to be liquidated. Liquidation of a Þrm has both economical and political
costs for the government, since, on the one hand, Þrms pay taxes, and on the other hand, unemployment
growth destroys the electorate support. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) considered bargaining between Þrms and
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the government for extra employment in exchange for transfers. While these transfers allow ineﬃcient Þrms
to survive, the society pays for political beneÞts of the government.
Governments beneÞts of bailing out lead to lower Þrms incentives, as they anticipate bail out. Kornai
(1980) was the Þrst to draw attention to the phenomenon of expected bail out and called it as the problem
of the soft budget constraints (SBC). The solution for SBC problem is not simple. Ex-ante harderning of
government Þnancial policy can even worsen the situation. Perotti (1998) developed the model, illustrating
how political goals of the government lead to failure of any attempts to reform the economy by ex-ante
tightening Þnancial policy. Failure occurs because the situation too many to fail leads to low probability of
ex-post liquidation of a particular Þrm and fewer Þrms undertake costly restructuring in the case of ex-ante
tight Þnancial policy. In particular, this model explains the failure of tightening Þnancial policy in Russia in
1992.
Government subsidies could perform not only as a source of protection of Þrms from liquidation, but also
as an investment tool to restructure Þrms. However, the level of subsidies fell dramatically during transition1
and, besides, the distribution of subsidies could be inßuenced by political factors.2
An alternative source of external Þnancing (the main in normal situations) is bank lending. A large
number of banks appeared in Russia at the beginning of the transition.3 Banks could promote managerial
incentives, as Þrms had to send a good signal to acquire a loan in a bank and produce enough cash to serve
the debt. Russian banks, however, were very passive in lending. Domestic credit to the economy was at
the level of only 12.7% of GDP in 1998, in contrast to signiÞcantly higher levels of credit in other transition
economies4 : the matter is that Russian banks used available funds mainly to operate on the government bond
market. An explanation for such a low level of credit in Russia could be that Þrms had low credibility in the
eyes of banks, and they were likely to default on their debt. Actually, unstable macroeconomic situation and
uncontrolled Þnancial pyramids schemes lead to dramatic increase of interest rate, and only risky projects
could have allowed Þrms to repay taken loans. According to the classical theory of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981),
this leads to credit rationing. There are examples from other transition economies, which provide evidence
for poor performance of bank loans. For instance, as Bonin and Huang (2001) discuss, banks in China, which
are state-owned, were directed to lend to state-owned enterprises and, as a result, the estimated proportion
of non-performing loans was about 29% of all loans in 1998.
Besides the problem of liquidity, the Þrms faced the so-called commitment problem, widely discussed
in the literature. Hart and Moore (1989) show that, due to Þrms inability to commit to long-term proÞt,
eﬃcient projects may not be Þnanced.5 Banks also could face the commitment problem. Dewatripont and
Maskin (1995) consider a model in which both the government and banks can create SBC for a Þrm. In
their analysis ex-post rationality of the lender destroys credibility of her commitment not to bail out and the
Þrms are subject to SBC. Mitchell (1993) considers an alternative way for creating SBC by banks  strategic
1See Roland (2000) for the discussion.
2Orlov, Paltseva and Zhuravskaya (2000) use enterprise-level data for 1996-1998 to provide empirical evidence that government
subsidies in Russia were mainly distributed not with the purpose of Þrms restructuring, but according to short-term political
reasons.
3There were 1360 banks in 1992 and 1713 banks in 1993 (World Bank, 1993).
4 60.1% of GDP in Czech Republic, 32.5% in Slovenia, 22.8% in Hungary and 20.6% in Poland in 1998.
5The paper is widely discussed in Hart (1995).
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creditor passivity, a situation, in which lenders have incentives to hide the information about bad loans from
the public.6 Other possible explanations for low bank lending include low bank reserves,7 low experience
of Russian bankers in risky lending, and large risks of investment into Russian real sector caused by large
monitoring and enforcement costs.
Thus, due to several problems, banks may have avoided lending to the real sector in Russia. The govern-
ments incentives to bail out Þrms could help Þrms to serve debt, and to make lending more attractive. These
incentives, however, have costs - soft budget constraints. In this paper, we look at one of the sources of ineﬃ-
cient under-Þnancing - the problem of lack of Þrms commitment to serve debt, and study a trade-oﬀ between
tight government policy and Þnancing. We develop a model close to one by Hart and Moore (1989), but
introduce a government that can bail out defaulted Þrms. First, we show that in the framework of the original
Hart and Moores model the higher the governments care about Þrms the closer the solution to the Þrst-best.
We then develop the model and show that social welfare depends on paternalism non-monotonously due to
soft budget constraints. Low level of paternalism, however, still improves the situation and the second-best
is reached with non-zero subsidization.
Our model predicts that a government caring only about expected net tax collection Þnances only Þrms
with medium performance, and among those Þrms, which are granted with subsidies, more eﬃcient Þrms
receive relatively lower subsidies. The model also predicts that the higher the government valuation of the
future leads to higher level of investment. We use a unique database on Russian Þrms balance sheets for
1996-2000 to perform empirical tests of these predictions. To account for sample selection in subsidization
and unobserved heterogeneity we employ semi-parametric estimation method for panel data sample selection
models developed by Kyriazidou (1997). The results of estimation show that the govenment have smaller
propensity to subsidize very eﬃcient and very ineﬃcient Þrms, and that outside Þnancing of Þrms is higher
in more protective regions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a basic model of incomplete short-term contracts
with no dependence of production on eﬀorts. In section 3 we consider interaction of the commitment problem
and the problem of SBC caused by implicit insurance of Þrms by the government. Testable hypotheses, data
and empirical methodology are described in section 4. Section 5 presents the results of empirical testing.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Basic model
2.1 Setup
We consider a two-period model with players of three types: a set of Þrms, competitive lenders, and
a government. There is a continuum of Þrms. Each Þrm is run by a risk-neutral manager that has an
investment project yielding y1 in t = 1 and y2 in t = 2,8 where the returns are diﬀerent across Þrms and are
6For complete survey of theory of SBC see Berglof and Roland (1998), Maskin and Xu (2001), Mitchell (2000).
7 In spite of the low level of living standards, the aggregate savings of Russian households are estimated up to 20 billion
dollars, but these savings are stored in socks due to the low conÞdence to banks.
8 In this paper we address a Þrm and a manager interchangeably.
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Figure 1: The time-line of the basic model
distributed according to atomless cdf F (y1, y2). The returns are certain and do not depend on eﬀort; there
is no investment opportunity in t = 1. Each manager has initially no own cash and needs investment in the
amount of K to run the project (the same for all the projects). For simplicity we assume that physical assets
value nothing and consequently liquidation value of each project is zero both in t = 1 and in t = 2.
The lenders are cash unconstrained. They can sign contracts with any Þrm. Following Hart and Moore
(1989) we assume that the Þrms can freely divert returns from the lenders, and consequently they have no
incentives to repay in t = 2. The lenders specify in the contracts the value of loan I and the repayment
P paid in period 1. The lender can make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the borrower in the case of default.9
Traditionally, net interest rate and discount rate of borrowers and lenders are normalized to zero.
Finally, consider a government that keeps the power with certainty in t = 1 and with exogenous probability
α in t = 2. It has no assets in t = 0 and collects taxes from all the returns. Tax rate is exogenous and equals
t. Tax payments are enforceable.10 This assumption is crucial, as creates incentives for bail out of Þrms by
the government. The government can subsidize Þrms, more exactly it can veriÞably pay to the lenders and
reduce the debt of a borrower, but alike the Þrms, it cannot bargain for reduction of debt. We consider a net
revenue maximizing government and its problem is
UG = (T1 − S1) + α(T2 − S2)→ max
s.t. S1 ≤ T1,
(1)
where Tt, St are total taxes and subsidies collected/paid in moment t.11 Thus, the government beneÞts from
survival of a Þrm and can Þnd it beneÞcial to bail it out in t = 1. It, however, cannot spend on subsidization
more than the whole current budget. Further we call the probability α as a measure of paternalism of the
government, because it reßects how much the government cares about the Þrms survival. The time-line of
the model is presented on Þgure 1.
9Consideration of other shares of bargaining power will not change the main results of the model, but it will involve extra
calculations. For example, for certain shares it is necessary to consider positive liquidation values.
10Hart and Moore (1998) oﬀer a rational for free divertion of cash by managers without a perspective of jail - sales to a
"friendly" Þrm by zero prices. This way does not work for tax evasion if to get rid of possibility of oﬀshoring and black cash.
11We do not write down the liquidity constraint for the second period, because S2 = 0 in the equilibrium. Further, we omit
S2, and denote subsidies given in t = 1 as S.
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2.2 Analysis of the basic model
Competitiveness of the credit market and certainty imply that only repaying Þrms get loans and con-
tracted net interest rate is zero, i.e. P = I. There can be multiple equilibria with P > K. All these equilibria
have no principle diﬀerences and we concentrate only on the equilibria with contracts (K,K).
All Þrms try to get a loan, as their outside opportunity is zero (they initially have no cash, and consequently
they do not invest). A Þrm repays if its debt D is lower than the beneÞt of survival (1 − t)y2 and if it has
enough cash for repayment, i.e. if (1 − t)y1 > D. Thus, it repays only if (1 − t)min(y1, y2) > D. If the
government has no incentives to subsidize (α = 0), then a Þrm is Þnanced only if
min(y1, y2) >
K
1− t (2)
while the Þrst-best is to Þnance if
y1 + y2 > K. (3)
If the government collects quite large taxes in t = 1,12 then it bails out a Þrm only if subsidy needed to
create incentives to repay is lower than expected beneÞt from taxes in t = 2. If the government decides to
subsidize a Þrm, then it minimizes expenditures on creating incentives to repay the debt (consequently, it
pays nothing for those who would be Þnanced under α = 0). Therefore, the government gives a subsidy
S(y1, y2) = K − (1− t)min(y1, y2) (4)
if
K − αty2 < (1− t)min(y1, y2) < K. (5)
Thus, the set of Þnanced Þrms Y F is:
Y F ≡ {(y1, y2) : K − αty2 < (1− t)min(y1, y2)}. (6)
Figure 2 represents Þnancing and subsidizing the Þrms as a function of their returns. The shaded area
corresponds to self-repaying Þrms, the striped area corresponds to subsidized Þrms (in the case, when liquidity
constraint of the government is not binding), the remaining area corresponds to not Þnanced Þrms. Under no
paternalism regime there are only self-repaying Þrms. Growth of α leads to expansion of the set of Þnanced
Þrms. This is the eﬀect of implicit insurance by the government. We emphasize that the government does not
care about the Þrms per se, but its stake in Þrms future returns is used by the lenders. Under α = 1 the set of
Þnanced Þrms still belongs to the set of Þnanced Þrms in the Þrst-best, what means that growth of paternalism
leads to social improvement. The result is quite expected, as the governments implicit insurance cannot lead
to Þnancing ineﬃcient projects (those with y1 + y2 < K), because a revenue maximizing government values
the future return of Þrms not more than a benevolent government does.
The situation is diﬀerent if liquidity constraint of the government is binding. In this case, the government
12 In particular, if its liquidity constraint is not binding.
5
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
↑α
t
K
−1
2y  
1y
The frontier of financed firms if liquidity 
constraint of the government is not binding
Isoquant of relative profitability
for the government 
K  
K
Figure 2: The solution with and without government intervention. The shaded area corresponds to α = 0
(no government intervention). The growth of α increases the number of Þnanced Þrms (the striped area is
added to the set of Þnanced Þrms). Additional Þnancing is eﬃcient, as the set of Þnanced Þrms lies above
the Þrst-best frontier.
bases its decision on the relative proÞtability of bail out, which is πr =
αty2
K − (1− t)min(y1, y2) .
13 It means
that the government bails out a Þrm, if Þrms relative proÞtability πr is greater, than the threshold level
π¯r > 1, and it has incentives to repay, i.e. if
(y1, y2) ∈ Y (α, t,K, π¯r) ≡ {(y1, y2) : K − αty2
π¯r
< (1− t)min(y1, y2) < K}, (7)
where π¯r is determined from the condition that the governments liquidity constraint is binding:ZZ
Y (α,t,K,π¯r)
(ty1 − S(y1, y2)) dy1dy2 = 0 (8)
An allocation, in which all the Þrms from Y (α, t,K, π¯r) are Þnanced, is the only allocation suspected to be
an equilibrium, but it is not an equilibrium. Indeed, one of the lenders can intervene by contracting positive
net interest rate with Þrms with very large y1, and y2 ∈
Ã
K
1− t ,
K
1− t+ αtπ¯r
!
.14 This intervention would
increase the government revenues, and allow to it to bail out the (additionally) Þnanced Þrms. Evidently,
this strategy is not itself an equilibrium one. Thus, there is no equilibrium if sum of subsidies deÞned by (4)
given to Þrms satisfying to (5) is lower than taxes paid by Þrms satisfying to condition of Þnancing (6).
Paternalism provides extra liquidity to Þrms, what weakly improves them. Expansion of the set of Þnanced
Þrms combined with the fact that only Þrms that are to be Þnanced in the Þrst-best world are Þnanced in the
13We omit discussion of problems caused by discreetness.
14These are very productive Þrms in the short-run that neither have incentives to repay on their own, nor are enough attractive
for the government that has scare resources, but that would be subsidized, if the government could borrow in t = 1.
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equilibrium, infers that growth of paternalism increases social welfare. Paternalism, however, is Þnanced by
taxes that are extracted from society, and only partially are returned. Moreover, there are Þrms that would
be Þnanced if there were no government, but are not Þnanced under low α, because they are illiquid due to
taxation (e.g. a Þrm with (y1, y2) = (K,K)). The question arises "Whether a grabbing government is needed
at all?" The answer to this question is ambiguous. Surely some Þrms suﬀer from the government, as they pay
taxes and gain nothing from the government, but at the same time some Þrms gain more than pay. Under some
conditions total production with the government is higher than without it, even despite distorting taxation.
The following example is an extreme case illustrating the idea: there are two types of Þrms - a share ∆ of
Þrms produce y1 = y2 = K+ δ, the remaining share 1−∆ produce y1 = K − ε, and y2 = K
ε
, where δ, ε > 0.
Suppose that (K+δ)(1−t) > K, then for low ε the ratio of total output (in two periods) with the government
to total output without the government is
2∆(K + δ) + (1−∆) ¡(K − ε) + Kε ¢
2∆(K + δ)
, and it approaches inÞnity,
when ε −→ 0. The corresponding ratio of Þrms beneÞts, ∆(2(K + δ)(1− t)−K) + (1−∆)(1− t)
K
ε
∆(2(K + δ)(1− t)−K) , also
approaches inÞnity, when ε −→ 0.
Summing up, the presented simple model shows that under a Þxed tax system growth in paternalism im-
proves the situation, when it does not aﬀect eﬀorts. Formally lack of budget resources leads to no equilibrium
situation. Further, we consider how the situation changes, when production is aﬀected by managerial eﬀorts.
3 A trade-oﬀ between the commitment problem and soft budget
constraints
3.1 Setup
In this section, we develop further the model, considered above. We introduce moral hazard into the
model. In particular, we assume that returns depend on costly eﬀorts. For simplicity eﬀorts are exerted only
in period t = 0 after Þnancing a project. Projects yield y1(e) in t = 1 and y2(e) in t = 2, where e is eﬀort
exerted by the manager. Functions y1(e), y2(e) are increasing and concave, and are the same for all the Þrms.
It is assumed that y1(e) < y2(e), and consequently all the managers prefer to repay, if they have enough
cash in t = 1. All the Þrms are characterized by technical eﬃciency parameter θ. All the managers bear
private cost C(e, θ), and costs are adversely related to θ. C(e, θ) satisÞes standard conditions: C(0, θ) = 0,
Ce(e, θ) > 0, Cee(e, θ) > 0, Cθ(e, θ) < 0 for all e > 0, and Ceθ(e, θ) < 0. Utility function of a manager of
type θ is
U(π, e|θ) = π −C(e, θ), (9)
where π is the monetary beneÞt of the manager. Eﬃciency types are distributed with atomless density
function f(θ) > 0 for all θ ≥ 0. There are extremely eﬃcient Þrms: Ce(e, θ) −→ 0 with θ → ∞, and there
are extremely ineﬃcient Þrms: Ce(e, θ) → ∞ with θ → 0. We also assume that there is no production
without eﬀorts: y1(0) = y2(0) = 0, and that the technology allows to generate enough cash to repay aidless:
y1(∞) > K
1− t . These assumptions imply that there are always Þrms that are willing to repay on their own
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if net interest rate is zero, and that there are Þrms that would not repay under any subsidy. We assume that
y1e(0) =∞ to avoid corner solutions with e = 0 in the best response of Þrms. The time-line of the model is
the same as on Þgure 1 with addition of costly eﬀorts exerted in t = 0.
3.2 Analysis of the case when the governments liquidity constraint is not bind-
ing
3.2.1 The lenders and the government
The lenders and the governments behavior is described in section 2. Once again, the lenders contract
(K,K) with Þrms that repay, and (0, 0) with the others. The government bails out Þrms if the subsidy to
maintain incentives to repay is lower than the expected taxes paid in t = 2. If the governments budget
constraint is binding, then the government bails out the Þrms that are the most "proÞtable" for it.15 In
contrast to the model from section 2, now the government bails out only the Þrms that do not have enough
cash on their own, because we assumed y1(e) < y2(e).
For a while, we consider the case of non-binding budget constraint of the government. In this case, there is
an implicit requirement level of eﬀorts eg, such that the government bails out all the Þrms that exert e ≥ eg
if they do not have enough cash to repay by themselves, and the Þrms exerting e < eg are to be liquidated.16
The level of eg is determined from
K − (1− t)y1(eg) = αty2(eg), (10)
whereK−(1−t)y1(eg) is the required subsidy and αty2(eg) is expected tax payment to the current government
in t = 2 if e = eg. Let us denote e0 as the level of eﬀort required to repay, i.e. (1− t)y1(e0) = K.17 Thus,
only Þrms exerting e ∈ [eg, e0) get a subsidy. Evidently, deg
dα
< 0, i.e. growth of paternalism leads to lower
requirements of the government to the Þrms, and soften their budget constraints.18
3.2.2 The Þrms
Conditional on getting a loan, Þrms choose between one of the following three basic strategies:
1) Exert eﬀort lower than the governments requirement eg. In this case, the Þrms get no subsidy and
cannot repay. Thus, they default and are liquidated.
2) Exert eﬀort not enough to repay on their own, but not lower than eg.19 In this case, the Þrms get a
subsidy equal exactly to the diﬀerence between debt and cash available to the Þrm: S = K − (1 − t)y1(e),
and repay.
3) Exert eﬀort enough to repay on their own. In this case, the Þrms get no subsidy, and repay on their
own.
15y2 is monotonously increasing function of y1. Therefore, "proÞtable" and "proÞtable for the government" are synonyms.
16Consequently, in equilibrium they are not Þnanced.
17Existence of e0 follows from the assumption that y1(∞) > K1−t .
18Formally, diﬀerentiation of (10) by α yields deg
dα
=
−ty2(eg)
(1−t)y1e (eg)+αty2e (eg)
< 0.
19Properties of production functions insure that eﬀort required to repay on your own is not lower than eg.
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Figure 3: ProÞt schedule of Þrms conditional on getting a loan. Points 1, 2, 3, 4 show the choices of diﬀerent
Þrms for a given proÞt-schedule.
Accounting for the lenders and the governments strategies and the fact that a Þrm repays whenever its
cash ßow in t = 1 is higher than its debt net of subsidy and when it has enough cash, the proÞt schedule
π(e, eg, e0) is
π(e, eg, e0) =

(1− t)y1(e) if e < eg;
(1− t)y2(e) if e ∈ [eg, e0);
(1− t)(y1(e) + y2(e))−K if e > e0.
(11)
Denote the Þrms reaction function in the case of non-binding governments liquidity constraint as
e(θ, eg, e0). Figure 3 presents the proÞt schedule and the four possible types of Þrms choice (four strategies).
Let us rank these strategies as 1 (corresponds to point 1 on Þgure 3), when a Þrm chooses not to repay and
divert all short-term cash y1(e); 2 (point 2), when a Þrm is subsidized, and the government is indiﬀerent
whether to bail out the Þrm or not (corner solution with subsidies); 3 (point 3), when a Þrm is subsidized,
and the government beneÞts from bail out (interior solution with subsidies); and 4 (point 4), when a Þrm is
self-Þnanced. Corresponding eﬀorts are20
e∗1(θ) = argmax((1− t)y1(e)−C(e, θ));
e∗2 = eg;
e∗3(θ) = argmax((1− t)y2(e)−C(e, θ));
e∗4(θ) = argmax((1− t) (y1(e) + y2(e))−C(e, θ)).
(12)
Each Þrm chooses one of these points - the one which gives the highest proÞt.21 The following lemma
simpliÞes the analysis of the best-response of the Þrms for a given level of paternalism.
Lemma 1. For any two Þrms θ1, θ2 : θ1 < θ2 ⇒ e(θ1, eg, e0) ≤ e(θ2, eg, e0), i.e. more eﬃcient Þrms
20Note, that e = 0 cannot be realized, because y1e (0) > 0; and e = e0 cannot be realized under eg < e0, because y1e (e) > 0
and y2e(e) > 0.
21Note that proÞt from exerting e∗1, e
∗
3, e
∗
4 is not always equal to the value of the maximized corresponding functional in the
optimum point.
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exert not lower eﬀorts than less eﬃcient Þrms do.22
Proof. See Appendix.
3.2.3 Equilibrium under no paternalism regime
When α = 0 the requirement level eg is equal to e0. Consequently, e∗3 is not realized under α = 0.
Basically there are two types of equilibria: with and without set of Þrms that exert e0. Denote θ14 the
solution of the following equation:23
(1− t)y1(e∗1(θ)) = (1− t)(y1(e∗4(θ)) + y2(e∗4(θ)))−K. (13)
If the requirement level is low enough, in particular, if e0 ≤ e∗4(θ14), then according to Lemma 1 all the
Þrms with θ > θ14 exert e(θ, e0, e0) = e∗4(θ) ≥ e∗4(θ14) > e0, i.e. they are Þnanced and they exert e∗4(θ).24
All the Þrms with θ < θ14 would exert e(θ, e0, e0) = e∗1(θ) < e∗1(θ14) < e0 ≤ e∗4(θ14) if they were Þnanced.
Consequently, they are not Þnanced, as they have no incentives to serve the debt. The Þrms with θ = θ14
are indiﬀerent between repayment and non-repayment. For simplicity of notation we assume that in such
situations Þrms choose the highest level of eﬀort, i.e. the eﬀort of any Þrm is max(e). Therefore, the Þrms
with θ14 are Þnanced.
If e0 > e∗4(θ14), then there are Þrms that are in the corner solution e = e0, i.e. which repay everything
what they earn in period t = 1. Denote the type of the Þrms that are indiﬀerent between eg and e∗1(θ) as
θ12(eg). The level of θ12(eg) is determined from:
(1− t)y1(e∗1(θ)) = (1− t)y2(eg). (14)
All the Þrms with θ < θ12(e0) would exert e(θ, e0, e0) = e∗1(θ) < e∗1(θ12) < e0, and they are not Þnanced.
All the Þrms, whose marginal costs of eﬀorts at e = e0 are not higher than marginal proÞt (1− t)(y1e(e0) +
y2e(e0)) (these are only those with θ > θ12), exert e
∗
4(θ). All the remaining Þrms exert e = e0. Generally,
θ24(eg, e0) is the border level of technical eﬃciency that separates strategies 2 and 4. The level of θ24(eg, e0)
is determined from:25
π(eg, eg, e0)−C(eg, θ) = π(e∗4(θ), eg, e0)−C(e∗4(θ), θ). (15)
Thus, if e0 > e∗4(θ14), then
e(θ, e0, e0) =

e∗1(θ) for θ < θ12(e0);
e0 for θ ∈ [θ12(e0), θ24(e0, e0));
e∗4(θ) for θ ≥ θ24(e0, e0);
(16)
22Generally e(θ, eg, e0) is not unique. Lemma 1 actually says that any Þrm with θ > θ¯ exerts e ≥ max
¡
e(θ¯, eg, e0)
¢
, and any
Þrm with θ < θ¯ exerts e ≤ min ¡e(θ¯, eg, e0)¢.
23The existence of the solution of this equation naturally follows from the properties of cost-function and concavity of pro-
duction functions. Uniqueness follows from Lemma1.
24 In further analysis of equilibrium, we widely use Lemma 1 and equilibrium path strategies of the lender and the government,
but we dont refer to them permanently to save the space.
25 (14) and (15) are true for any α. Under α = 0, θ24 is simply the solution of equation e∗4(θ) = e0.
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and if e0 ≤ e∗4(θ14), then
e(θ, e0, e0) =
(
e∗1(θ) for θ < θ14;
e∗4(θ) for θ ≥ θ14.
(17)
3.2.4 Eﬀect of paternalism on incentives and Þnancing. Comparative statics.
In this section, we analyze the impact of paternalism on equilibrium. Since the level of paternalism α
is adversely related to the level to the governments "requirement" eg, we look at the changes that happen,
when eg decreases from e0 to 0, what corresponds to changes of α from 0 to inÞnity.
First, consider the case, when e0 ≤ e∗4(θ14), i.e. when only two strategies are possible - 1 and 4 under no
paternalism regime. In this case, the equilibrium is the same as in the case α = 0 and deÞned by (17) until
eg < e
0
g, where e
0
g is the level of the requirement, when Þrms of type θ14 have three optimal choices e
∗
1, eg,
and e∗4.26 Further decline of eg leads to switch of Þrms with θ = θ14 from strategy 4 to strategy 2. The level
of e0g is derived from:
π(eg, eg, e0)−C(eg, θ14) = π(e∗4(θ14), eg, e0)−C(e∗4(θ14), θ14). (18)
Suppose that the requirement level eg is just a bit lower than e0g. In this case there are Þrms (of type
θ24(eg, e0)) that are indiﬀerent between playing strategy 4 and strategy 2. The level of θ24(eg, e0) is deter-
mined in the same way as in the case of no paternalism and is derived from (15). Further decline of eg leads
to switching some Þrms from strategies 1 and 4 to strategy 2. In particular, the most eﬃcient Þrms that
under lower α would choose not to repay, now would prefer repaying; the least eﬃcient Þrms among those
that repaid on their own decrease eﬀort (and get a subsidy) when α grows. All subsidized Þrms are in the
corner solution e = eg, when eg is just slightly lower than e0g. Thus these Þrms beneÞt from further decline
of α, because they get closer to their interior solutions e∗3(θ) on the proÞt schedule branch π = (1− t)y2(e).
At some point, however, further growth of paternalism does not beneÞt all of subsidized Þrms. Denote θ34
the level of technical eﬃciency of the Þrms that are indiﬀerent between branches of the proÞt schedule giving
(1− t)(y1(e) + y2(e))−K and (1− t)y2(e). The level of θ34 is derived from:
π(e∗3(θ), eg, e0)−C(e∗3(θ), θ1) = π(e∗4(θ), eg, e0)−C(e∗4(θ), θ1). (19)
There are no Þrms playing strategy 3 (interior solution with subsidies) when eg > e∗3(θ34). When eg <
e∗3(θ34), there are Þrms that get subsidies and exert eﬀort higher than eg. These are the Þrms with θ < θ34
for which marginal cost of eﬀort at eg is lower than the marginal beneÞt (1 − t)y2e(eg). Thus, the border
level of eﬃciency between Þrms playing strategies 2 and 3, θ23(eg), is determined from:
(1− t)y2e(eg) = Ce(eg, θ23), (20)
what is equivalent to e∗3(θ23) = eg.
26Evidently, e0g > e∗3(θ34).
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Figure 4: Graphical treatment of the equilibrium for e0 > e∗4(θ14).
Summing up, if e0 ≤ e∗4(θ14), then the best response of Þrms is
e(θ, eg, e0) =
(
e∗1(θ) for θ < θ14;
e∗4(θ) for θ ≥ θ14;
for eg ≥ e0g (21)
e(θ, eg, e0) =

e∗1(θ) for θ < θ12(eg);
eg for θ ∈ [θ12(eg), θ24(eg));
e∗4(θ) for θ ≥ θ24(eg);
for eg ∈ [e∗3(θ34), e0g) (22)
e(θ, eg, e0) =

e∗1(θ) for θ < θ12(eg);
eg for θ ∈ [θ12(eg), θ23(eg));
e∗3(θ) for θ ∈ [θ23(eg), θ34);
e∗4(θ) for θ ≥ θ34.
for eg < e∗3(θ34) (23)
The analysis is similar in the case when e0 > e∗4(θ14). In this case, at any level of paternalism there are
Þrms that exert minimum level of eﬀort just necessary for repayment. If eg ∈ [e∗3(θ34), e0), then the best
response of Þrms is deÞned by (22), and if eg < e∗3(θ34), then the best response of Þrms is deÞned by (23).
The presented analysis implies that one needs to determine borders of eﬃciency θ12(eg), θ14, θ23(eg),
θ24(eg, e0), θ34(e0), and eﬀort/requirement levels e0, e0g, e∗3(θ34), e∗4(θ14) to describe equilibrium at any level
of paternalism α. It is also needed to analyze dependence of borders from paternalism to study comparative
statics. In Appendix we formally show that
∂θ12
∂α
< 0,
∂θ23
∂α
< 0,
∂θ24
∂α
(
> 0 for eg < e∗3(θ34);
< 0 for eg > e∗3(θ34).
Figure 4 presents graphical treatment of the solution for the case, when e0 > e∗4(θ14). Growth of paternal-
ism corresponds to reading the Þgure from right to left. Under α = 0 (which corresponds to e0) two strategies
12
are realized: 1 and 4. Firstly, increase of paternalism leads to no changes, until eg reaches e0g. Then further
increase leads to realization of strategy 2: the most technically eﬃcient Þrms among those that were not
Þnanced under lower levels of α and the least eﬃcient among those that were self-repaying switch to exerting
eg. Further growth of paternalism expands the set of subsidized Þrms at the expense of sets consisting of
self-repaying and not Þnanced Þrms. When α is so high that eg < e∗3(θ34), then all the four strategies are
realized. Further growth of paternalism has no eﬀect on the set of self-Þnanced Þrms; the most eﬃcient Þrms
that exerted eg exert eﬀorts higher than the (reduced) requirement, and consequently the set of Þrms playing
strategy 3 expands at the expense of Þrms playing strategy 2. At the same time, the number of Þrms that
exert eﬀorts just to repay expands due to switches from the set of Þrms that are not Þnanced under lower α.
If e0 < e∗4(θ14), then graphical treatment of analysis of equilibrium looks similarly, but without part to the
right from e0g (on Þgure 4).
Figure 4 yields several conclusions about relation between lending, subsidization, technical eﬃciency and
eﬀorts. It follows from
∂θ12
∂α
< 0 that the number of Þnanced Þrms non-strongly increases with growth of
paternalism.27 Denoting the measure of Þrms that get loans as L(α), this claim is summarized in Proposition
1A.
Proposition 1A.
dL
dα
≥ 0, i.e. the higher level of paternalism, the more Þrms are Þnanced.28
If we denote the indicator of Þnancing Þrm θ as l(α, θ), we can get a stronger version of Proposition 1A:
Proposition 1B. l(α, θ) is a non-decreasing function of α.
Another proposition follows from Lemma 1, properties of borders of the set of subsidized Þrms (those
that play strategies 2 or 3), and the fact that the higher exerted eﬀort leads to lower given subsidy (if any):
Proposition 2. Only Þrms with intermediate eﬃciency and intermediate eﬀorts are subsidized. If a Þrm
gets a subsidy, then the higher its eﬀort, the lower the subsidy:
∂S
∂θ
≤ 0, if S > 0.
Figure 4 can be drawn in eﬀort-requirement axes. For this sake, one needs to determine levels of the
requirement, when the Þrms switch strategies. Denote the level of the requirement, when a Þrm θ is indif-
ferent between strategy i and strategy j as eijg (θ). On Þgure 4 these levels are intercepts of horizontal lines
corresponding to θ and borders of sets i and j. These levels are determined from the following equations:
e12g (θ) : π(e
∗
1(θ), eg, e0)−C(e∗1(θ), eg, e0) = π(eg, eg, e0)−C(eg, eg, e0);
e23g (θ) : e
∗
3(θ) = eg;
e24g (θ) : π(e
∗
4(θ), eg, e0)−C(e∗4(θ), eg, e0) = π(eg, eg, e0)−C(eg, eg, e0).
Figure 5 illustrates the dependence of eﬀorts on the requirement level. We again analyze comparative
statics when paternalism grows. Firms with θ ≥ θ34 always exert e∗4(θ) and they are not shown on Þgure
5. Consider a Þrm with θ < θ34 that plays strategy 4 under α = 0 (Þgure 5.a). Initially this Þrm does not
respond to a decrease in the requirement level, however, at eg = e24g (θ) it switches to strategy 2 and keeps
e = eg until eg ≤ e23g (θ). When eg = e23g (θ) the Þrm switches from strategy 2 to strategy 3. Further decline
of eg has no eﬀect on this Þrm. Now consider a Þrm that plays strategy 2 under α = 0 (Þgure 5.b). This
Þrm follows strategy 2 until eg ≤ e23g (θ). Further growth of paternalism (eg < e23g (θ)) leads to an interior
27This is also true in case when θ12 is not determined, i.e. when eg > e0g and e0 < e∗4(θ14).
28 dL
dα
is strictly positive if e0 > e∗4(θ14) and eg < e
0
g , or if e0 ≤ e∗4(θ14).
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Figure 5: Dependence of eﬀorts on the level of the governments requirement: (a) for Þrms with θ < θ34 that
play strategy 4 under α = 0; (b) for Þrms play strategy 2 under α = 0; (c) for Þrms play strategy 1 under
α = 0.
solution on the proÞt schedule branch with subsidies, e∗3(θ). Finally, consider a Þrm that is not Þnanced
under no paternalism regime (Þgure 5.c). This Þrm would divert all the cash in t = 1, if it were Þnanced,
until eg ≤ e12g (θ). Further growth of paternalism leads to exerting eﬀort equal exactly to the requirement,
until eg ≤ e23g (θ). At eg = e23g (θ) the Þrm switches to e∗3(θ) and follows this strategy for all eg ≤ e23g (θ).
Thus, conditional on getting a loan, Þrms exert lower eﬀorts under higher level of paternalism. The
presented discussion brings us to the following lemma:
Lemma 2. If a Þrm is Þnanced both under α1 and under α2, such that α1 < α2, then e(θ, eg(α1), e0) ≥
e(θ, eg(α2), e0).
This is a quite standard result of soft budget constraints. We use it in the further analysis.
3.3 Limitations of paternalism - liquidity constraint of the government
In previous sections we considered equilibrium with an implicit assumption of non-binding governments
liquidity constraint. In this section, we analyze the equilibrium under binding liquidity constraint. First
we assume that the government can borrow in period t = 1, i.e. the government can have negative balance
of payments in t = 1, and investigate how the governments balance of payments depends on paternalism.
Then, using this dependence we Þnd equilibrium under binding liqidity constraint.
If the government can borrow in t = 1, then it bails out all the Þrms that exert e > eg, where eg is
determined from (10). Denote the diﬀerence between total tax payments in period 1 and total subsidies that
would be given if the government could have negative balance of payments as B(α).29 This function has the
following properties:
(a) B(0) > 0;
(b) If there is α∗ such that B(α∗) = 0, then B(α) < 0 for α > α∗. Moreover, Bα(α) < 0 for α > α∗.
Proof. See Appendix.
29Thus we allow B < 0. If the government cannot borrow, then its liquidity constraint in terms of B is B ≥ 0.
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The intuition behind the proofs of properties is the following: (a) if the government does not bail out,
then its budget is positive, because there are always self-repaying Þrms; (b) reduction of the governments
requirement reduces incentives of Þrms that are Þnanced under higher level of the requirement, and addition-
ally Þnanced Þrms are the least eﬃcient, and correspondingly bring negative value to the short-term balance
of payments.
At this stage we bring liquidity constraint back to the problem of the government. On the basis of
properties of B(α) we show that the growth of paternalism above α∗ leads to no changes of equilibrium.
Proposition 3. If ∃α∗: B(α∗) = 0⇒ equilibrium for α > α∗ is the same as under α∗.30
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 has tremendous policy implications. It implies that in the case of federal structure of an
economy, which takes place in Russia, a federal center can make improvements using transfer system. On the
one hand, it it possible to limit paternalism in relatively rich regions, when soft budget constraint dominate
positive eﬀect of overcoming the commitment problem, on the other hand, it allows an implicit insurance to
work in poorer regions, in which eﬀect is strongly limited by initial distribution of Þrms with little number
of technically developed Þrms.
3.4 Eﬀect of paternalism on social welfare and production
In this section, we consider how paternalism aﬀects social welfare. Due to quasilinearity of preferences
of all the agents, we consider the sum of all utilities as a social functional. This functional includes all the
collected taxes, because independent of who keeps the power, the collected taxes yield utility to power holder.
Including creditors utility into the social functional is not essential, because in any equilibrium lenders receive
zero proÞts. The Þrst-best is to Þnance Þrms with
max
e
(y1(e) + y2(e)−C(e, θ)) ≥ K, (24)
and optimal eﬀorts of Þnanced Þrms are correspondingly
e∗ = argmax (y1(e) + y2(e)−C(e, θ)) . (25)
Social welfare is given by
SW (α) =
θ24Z
θ12
(y1(eg) + y2(eg)−C(eg, θ)−K) dF (θ) + (26)
+
∞Z
θ24
(y1(e
∗
4(θ)) + y2(e
∗
4(θ))−C(e∗4(θ), θ)−K) dF (θ)
30 If B(1) ≥ 0, then liquidity constraint is never binding.
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Figure 6: Dependence of social welfare ∆SW (α, λ, t,K) = SW (α, λ, t,K) − SW (0, λ, t,K) on paternalism
for y1(e) = e, y2(e) = λe (λ > 1), C(e, θ) = e
2
2θ , θ ∼ U [0, 10], K = 1.
when three Þrms strategies are realized, and by
SW(α) =
θ23Z
θ12
(y1(eg) + y2(eg)−C(eg, θ)−K) dF (θ) + (27)
+
θ34Z
θ23
(y1(e
∗
3(θ)) + y2(e
∗
3(θ))−C(e∗3(θ), θ)−K) dF (θ) +
+
∞Z
θ34
(y1(e
∗
4(θ)) + y2(e
∗
4(θ))−C(e∗4(θ), θ)−K) dF (θ)
when there are four Þrms strategy realizations.31
Due to Proposition 1A, growth of paternalism leads to increased Þnancing, what improves the situation.
At the same time, growth of paternalism reduces incentives. Depending on the type of a Þrm and level of
paternalism, marginal eﬀect of eﬀort decrease can bring the Þrm closer to the Þrst-best solution or farther
from it. The model gives no direct predictions for the marginal eﬀect of paternalism under any α, but some
conclusions can be made for the case α = 0. Evidently there is no eﬀect of small increase of paternalism for
the case α = 0, if e0 > e∗4(θ14), i.e. if there are only two types of Þrms strategies.
Let us consider the case e0 ≤ e∗4(θ14). Social welfare in this case is represented by (26). Using Leibnitzs
rule, we diﬀerentiate (26) by eg at e0 and get:
31The case, when only two types of Þrms strategies are realized, is not considered in the paper, because there is no marginal
eﬀect of paternalism in this case.
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Figure 7: Dependence of output ∆OUT (α,λ, t,K) = OUT (α, λ, t,K)− OUT (0, λ, t,K) on paternalism for
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∂SW
∂eg
¯¯¯¯
eg=e0
=
θ24Z
θ12
(1− t) (y1e(e0) + y2e(e0)−Ce(e0, θ)) dF (θ) + (28)
+t
θ24Z
θ12
(y1e(e0) + y2e(e0)) dF (θ)−
− (y1(e0) + y2(e0)−C(e0, θ)−K) f(θ12)∂θ12(e0)
∂eg
.
The Þrst and the last terms in (28) are negative, while the second term is positive. Thus, under relatively
low taxes, social welfare is an increasing function of paternalism at α = 0. In other words, if the positive
eﬀect of commitment problem on incentives of some Þrms among those that exert e0 under α = 0 is neglected,
then a small increase of paternalism positively aﬀects the social welfare.
The model does not give straightforward results for the eﬀect of paternalism on production, as due to
increased paternalism a certain share of Þnanced Þrms reduce the output, but newly Þnanced Þrms arise.
These two eﬀects work in opposite directions and the correspondent marginal eﬀects caused by the change
in paternalism are of the same order - many Þrms slightly reduce production versus small fraction of Þrms
increases production from 0 to y1(eg). Thus the eﬀect of paternalism on the industrial development remains
purely empirical question.
The dependence of the social welfare and the aggregate output on the level of paternalism can be illustrated
on the basis of a simple example. Consider y1(e) = e, y2(e) = λe (λ > 1), C(e, θ) =
e2
2θ
, θ ∼ U [0, 10], K = 1.32
Figures 6-7 present corresponding illustration.
It is noteworthy that the more economy loses from the commitment problem (equivalently, the higher
tax rate leading to liquidity problems and the higher growth rate), the more the economy gains from a small
32We picked such example for simplicity of calculations. Even though it does not completely satisfy the assumptions of the
model, the preceding theoretical analysis would still be valid.
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increase in paternalism at α = 0. The maximum gains from paternalism are also higher in these cases.
4 Testable hypotheses and empirical methodology
In this section, we state testable hypotheses and discuss the approach to their testing. We also describe
available data sources. It should be noted that our data are of panel structure, therefore, we may employ
panel data estimators, which allow us to solve the problem of unobserved heterogeneity among Þrms.
4.1 Hypotheses and estimation models
In section 3, we showed how the government could reduce negative eﬀect of Þrms inability to commit to
repayment in the long-term. Our model yields straightforward conclusions about relations between invest-
ment, subsidization, performance and governments care about the future for the case of revenue maximizing
government.
The model does not include many features that could characterize Russia. The main two assumptions
are exogeneity of incumbents probability to get re-elected, α, and complete independence of lenders from
the government. The Þrst assumption hardens the choice of the proxy for the governments care about
the future, α. Actually, one of the potential proxies for α is the closeness of elections. According to the
model the government has lower incentives to bail out, as it will survive with lower probability. On the
other hand, subsidization can increase probability to win elections and closeness to elections would stimulate
implicit Þrms insurance. Without the second assumption our model would have no sense. Akhmedov (2000)
provides empirical evidence for the years 1996-1998 that banks pursued economic goals rather than political
ones. His study provides the ground for our assumptions.
The Þrst two hypotheses relate Þrms performance, level of subsidization and governments care. As we
showed in section 3, Þrms with intermediate levels of productivity are more likely to receive government
subsidies than Þrms with more extreme level of productivity. At the same time, as the amount of subsidy
is inversely related to the output in our model, among those Þrms, which are granted with subsidies, less
productive Þrms get relatively more subsidies. Thus we can propose the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. Extremely eﬃcient and extremely ineﬃcient Þrms are less likely to receive subsidies than
Þrms with intermediate levels of eﬃciency.
Hypothesis 2. Among those Þrms that receive subsidies less eﬃcient Þrms receive relatively higher
subsidies.
When analyzing government subsidies, we have to account for the fact that our sample contains both
Þrms, which are granted with subsidies, and those, which are not. Thus we face a sample selection problem
in a sense that those Þrms, which got subsidies, were selected somehow and that the government oﬃcials
decisions about granting a subsidy and about its size may be independent from each other.33
33Note that if we assume that underlying processes for the choice of Þrms, which receive subsidies, and the determination of
the amount of a subsidy are the same, censored regression estimation (Tobit I model) could be employed instead. However, we
cannot see an a priori justiÞable explanation of why these processes are the same, even though some of the factors inßuencing
these decisions may necessarily coincide. This is also a reason of why we put quotation marks for a selection term  our model
is not a selection model in a usual sense as we can always observe dependent variable.
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To account both for unobserved heterogeneity and sample selection, the Þrst two hypotheses are tested
by using the estimation of a panel data sample selection model34 with Þrms Þxed eﬀects in both selection
and main equations:35 
y∗it = x
∗
itβ + α
∗
i + ε
∗
it;
yit = dity∗it;
dit = I(zitγ + ηi − uit > 0).
(29)
There exist at least three diﬀerent estimators for such models, which are proposed by Wooldridge (1985),
Kyriazidou (1997) and Rochina-Barrachina (1999). The estimators diﬀer in assumptions that are imposed
on the distribution of error terms and selection term. The second estimator seems to be the most appealing,
as it is more ßexible in the sense that it does not impose parametric assumptions on the distribution of any
of the unobservables. This estimator is based on the fact that the sample selection eﬀects are equal for the
Þrms, for which zitγ = zisγ and dit = dis = 1, therefore taking pairwise diﬀerencing eliminates not only
unobserved heterogeneity but also the selection problem.
Thus two-step Heckman procedure could be applied, where γ is estimated in the Þrst step and β is
estimated in the second step by weighted least squares regression applied to the Þrst diﬀerences with higher
weights given to observations such that (zit − zis)γ is close to zero, and where kernel weights can be used.
Asymptotic normality of the estimator β is obtained under the assumption that the convergence rate of
the estimator for β is slower than the convergence rate of the estimator for γ. To satisfy this requirement,
the selection equation could be estimated by conditional logit (Chamberlain, 1980) or smoothed maximum
score methods (Horowitz, 1992).
There are not many empirical applications of Kyriazidous method in the literature. Charlier, Melenberg
and van Soest (2001) apply the described method to investigate expenditures on housing in Netherlands.
However, the overidentiÞcation restrictions of their model were rejected, which might testify for misspeciÞca-
tion. Dustmann and Rochina-Barrachina (2000) compare this method to the other two mentioned methods
in application to estimation of eﬀect of labor experience on wages. The estimator does not perform well
in their study, because a conditional exchangeability assumption, imposed by Kyriazidou (1997), which is
crucial for estimation, is rejected by the data. Besides, identiÞcation problems arise when any variation in
experience coincides with changes in the selection index. These results show that we should be careful in
implementation of the method in our study.
We apply Kyriazidous estimator to investigate the level of subsidies given to enterprises:
S∗it = xitβ1 + Prodβ2 + αi + εit; i = 1, ...,N ; t = 1, ..., T
Sit = ditS∗it;
dit = I(zitγ1 + Proditγ2 + Prod
2
itγ3 + ηi − uit > 0),
(30)
where dit takes value of one, if a Þrm receives a subsidy. To test hypothesis 1 we are interested in the eﬀect of
a square term of a productivity parameter (Prod) on the indicator variable dit. The eﬀect of this productivity
34This is a panel version of Tobit II model in Amemiyas (1985) classiÞcation.
35We prefer Þxed eﬀects speciÞcation to random eﬀects approach, because the latter is non-robust to distributional assump-
tions, which are necessary to be imposed in this case, and, besides, it is computationally cumbersome.
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parameter on the logarithm of subsidies per capita S∗it in the main equation will help us test hypothesis 2.
It should be emphasized that the main equation is estimated for Þrm i only for such pairs of periods t and
s, for which dit = dis = 1. Due to the deÞnition of the selection index dit the second step of the estimation
procedure is carried out only for Þrms receiving subsidies, which is the exact statement hypothesis 2.
The productivity parameter Prod is measured as a deviation of Þrms costs per ruble of sales from the
industry annual average level in the region of Þrms location.36 Such measure allows us to account for the
diﬀerences in Þrms cost functions across industries and across regions. The vector zit contains a logarithm of
real regional subsidies per worker in the region net of federal trend, a relative size of a Þrm in a correspondent
region in terms of employment and time dummies. The vector xit contains the same variables, excluding
Þrms size.37
Accounting for the fact that, other things being equal, higher costs indicate lower performance, and given
the predictions of our model, the negative sign of the estimate γ3 would allow us not to reject the hypothesis
1, and the positive estimate β2 would justify our conjecture that less productive Þrms receive relatively higher
subsidies.
Another prediction of our model is that lenders are more willing to provide loans to Þrms under higher
levels of government paternalism. Intuitively, since more Þrms are likely to receive subsidies, more Þrms will
be able to return loans, and lenders are less reluctant in lending. Thus, we can state our third hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. The softer is the regional government, the higher is the level of outside investment.
To test hypothesis 3 we measure the level of softness of the government using the level of regional subsidies
to enterprises per worker. We are employing panel logit speciÞcation with Þrms Þxed eﬀects:
lit = I (Subsitθ1 +mitθ2 + χi + ξit > 0) (31)
where lit is an indicator which takes value one if a Þrm receives a loan. Vector mit contains time dummies,
a relative size of a Þrm in a correspondent region in terms of employment, and a logarithm of a lag of a
productivity parameter, measured as deviation of Þrms costs per ruble of sales from the regional average
level in the industry.
We do not reject hypothesis 3 if we get a positive and statistically signiÞcant estimate for coeﬃcient
θ1. Note, that as discussed above, we can substitute subsidies with the time left before elections, which
is another proxy for the governments softness. Then, in this case we expect a negative coeﬃcient for this
variable to support the hypothesis: the less time is left before election, the harder is the government and
less loans are given, since government will get taxes with lower probability. Alternatively, Treisman and
Gimpelson (2001) emphasize the trade-oﬀ between diﬀerent instruments of manipulation of public opinion
and subsidies can be one of useful instruments to get votes. Thus, the opposite result would mean that
the assumption that probability of winning does not depend on the government subsidies was too strong.
Moreover, Akhmedov, Ravichev and Zhuravskaya (2003) show that industrial subsidies are widely used on
36As it is common for similar datasets there could be a measurement error problem, associated with our data. However, as
Dustman and Rochina-Barrachina (2000) illustrate, diﬀerencing out, which is used in Kyriazidous approach, eliminates this
problem even if a variable enters the equation in a non-linear way.
37We exclude Þrms size to satisfy exclusion restriction of the method.
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the eve of regional elections and increase the probability of winning. Thus, it is more likely that political
beneÞts should be accounted for. Overall, while the reasons of the government care about the Þrms are not
so important, the essense is that the government actually Þnance Þrms, and rational lenders are to account
for it.
4.2 Data and sample
In our analysis we are using a Goskomstats38 database on Russian Þrms balance sheets, which contain
characteristics of Þrms performance, including their capital structure, level of received bank loans and sub-
sidies for the years 1996-2000. After cleaning data we draw a sample of Þrms with non-missing data on the
amount of loans and subsidies. We updated data on output and employment from the Russian Enterprise
Registry Longitudinal Database (RERLD). Additional data on employment were drawn from the website of
Federal Securities Commission. Data on aggregate regional subsidies were taken from monthly budgets of
regions, published by Ministry of Finance, and data on regional employment from the statistical abstract
Russias Regions, published annually by Goskomstat. We corrected all monetary variables for the denom-
ination of the year 1998, and we adjust for the level of region-speciÞc inßation so that all variables are in
thousands of rubles of 1997. The Þnal correction for outliers was done by dropping all observations, which
did not Þt in the middle 98% of the distribution (the highest and the lowest 1%).39
For our analysis, we use all the Þrms whose balance sheets are present for at least two years. Table 1
presents description of the sample. Interestingly, average amount of subsidies given to Þrms was incredibly
high in the year 1996 and has signiÞcantly decreased afterwards. The situation was similar for the average
amount of loans. The Þnancial crisis of 1998 was probably the main reason of the sharp decline in average
amount of subsidies and loans.
The changes in the relative amounts of subsidies and loans were not so profound. The average levels of
subsidies and loans per ruble of output were the highest in the year 1996 (Table 2). There was a sharp decline
afterwards, followed by a little variation in the amount of relative subsides starting from the year 1997 and
a gradual increase in the average amount of loans per ruble of output. Analogous observations are true for
the average amounts of loans and subsidies per worker. It should be noted that Þrms with subsidies were
more likely to get loans in all years except the year 1997: the average level across groups diﬀered from 2 per
cent to a few times. At the same time, no similar pattern across years was observed for the amount relative
subsidies depending on the Þrms receipt of loans.
Description of the variables with the distribution by amount of subsidies and loans is given in Table 3.
The variable Cost, which stands for the productivity parameter, was computed as a deviation of Þrms costs
from the industry average level in the region in corresponding year. Note, that Þrms, which receive not only
subsidies, but also loans, tend to be located in regions with higher level of regional subsidies. Besides these
Þrms are bigger on average than Þrms, which are not Þnanced.
The distribution of Þrms by the amount of subsidy and amount of loan is presented in Table 4. The
38The State Committee on Statistics of the Russian Federation.
39Bollinger and Chandra (2001) suggest an optimal trimming ways for the analysis of OLS models, however, there are no
justiÞable methods for semi-parametric methods. Therefore, our trimming thresholds are arbitrary.
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number of Þrms receiving bank loans relative to that of not granted Þrms in our sample has decreased
signiÞcantly by 1998, but has been increasing since then. This pattern is probably explained by the fact that
a part of banks resources released after the crash of government bond market in 1998. Besides, it may be a
sign of the gradual banks recovery after the Þnancial crisis.
5 Estimation results
The results of estimation are presented in Table 5. We employed the conditional logit method to estimate
the selection equation in (30) and test hypothesis 1. For each Þrm this estimation technique employs only
those pairs of periods, between which there was a switch in the subsidization policy. Thus if such transitions
are rare to observe, the estimation could be imprecise. The policy switch occurred in 22 percent of transitions
across periods for Þrms in the sample used for the selection equation estimation, and we suppose this number
of switches to be suﬃcient for application the technique.
SigniÞcant negative coeﬃcient for the squared term of productivity parameter supports hypothesis 1: very
eﬃcient and very ineﬃcient Þrms are less likely to get a government subsidy. Another statistically signiÞcant
result is that Þrms with higher weight in regional employment have higher probability to be supported.
This result can be explained both by political motives and by economic ones. On the one hand, large Þrms
have larger political weight, as they employ a signiÞcant share of local population (for example Novolipetsky
Metallurgy Combinat employs up to 15% of regional centers, Lipetsk, labor force). On the other hand,
large Þrms are easier to be taxed, as average monitoring costs decrease with scale (see Gehlbach, 2003). The
estimates for the time dummies testify that the likelihood of receiving a subsidy was higher in the middle of
1990s rather than later.
We use the results of the conditional logit estimation to construct kernel weights for the pairs of periods
in the main equation estimation. We employ a normal density Þrst order kernels. We use Horowitzs (1992)
procedure to deal with the problem of bandwidth selection. Brießy, optimal bandwidth is chosen as a value,
which yields the minimum of mean square error constructed using some arbitrary initial level of bandwidth.40
While the positive sign of the coeﬃcient for the productivity parameter does support our prediction
that more ineﬃcient Þrms get relatively higher subsidies, the t-test does not reject the hypothesis that
this coeﬃcient is equal to zero. This result might be caused by the fact that the variation in costs is highly
correlated with the variation in the selection index. Interestingly, time dummy variables are highly signiÞcant
and mirror the patterns in the data: relatively higher subsidies per capita were given in the middle of 1990s.
Finally, the results of the estimation of conditional logit model for testing hypothesis 3 show that Þrms
are more likely to get a bank loan in regions with higher level of subsidies, which goes in accordance with the
prediction of our model. At the same time, more productive Þrms have more chances to get a loan, what is
one of the direct predictions of the model. The analysis of time dummies shows that lenders were less willing
to provide loans in the years from 1997-1999, with the year 1998 being the toughest in this sense. The last
observation could be explained by highly volatile Þnancial atmosphere of the year 1998: in the Þrst half of
40This method is similar to the plug-in method used in kernel density estimation.
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the year there was a huge rise in the amount of traded government obligations and there was a Þnancial crisis
with all its consequences afterwards.
Summing up, we observe that in spite of omitting political goals in the model, the most of hypotheses,
following from it, cannot be rejected by the employed tests. The most striking result is that Þrms get loans
more likely in the regions with higher subsidies. It signals that lenders could consider local governments
softness as an implicit insurer of Þrms.
6 Conclusions and policy implications
The paper oﬀered an alternative view on the governments softness and its impact on eﬃciency. We
built a theoretical model based on the framework of model of Hart and Moore (1989) by including the
government caring about only net expected budget revenues. We showed that the decision whom to subsidize
depends on Þrms performance in a non-monotonic way. At the same time, conditional on getting a subsidy,
the value of subsidy negatively depends on Þrms performance. We also showed that Þnancing increases with
the growth in the level of governments paternalism. However, these eﬀects are limited by the governments
liquidity constraint: when it becomes binding, the further growth in paternalism does not have any impact.
The model shows that the governments care about Þrms brings in three eﬀects: negative eﬀect of soft
budget constraints and positive eﬀects of increased Þnancing and reduced overproduction, caused by short-
term liquidity constraints. We showed that under relatively low tax rate positive eﬀects overweight.
We tested our conjectures using data on balance sheets of Russian Þrms for 1996-2000. We employed
semi-parametric methods to avoid imposing limiting distributional requirement. The results of estimation
mainly support our hypotheses. We found that Þrms with intermediate levels of productivity are more likely
to get subsidies and that the softness of the regional governments stimulates banks lending to Þrms, which
we consider as the main result of the paper. At the same time we did not Þnd signiÞcant evidence that less
productive Þrms receive more subsidies.
The fact that subsidization policy may aﬀect lending process oﬀers a venue for policy design. In particular,
for regional policy one can think about altering probability of regional governor re-election by an upper level
authorities and federal transfers to a region as policy instruments. The former has various restrictions,
including moral ones. The latter allows to reduce costs of the lack of commitment by smoothing regional
diﬀerences.
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Table 1. Description of the sample.
Year Number of Þrms Avg. amount of subsidies Avg. amount of loans
(in thous. rubles of 1997) (in thous. rubles of 1997)
1996 472 34588 189157
[378532.8] [2034780]
1997 3421 4304 48421
[70968.1] [1628934.1]
1998 4883 1611 17473
[26279.7] [242878.7]
1999 5449 2340 27914
[43109.5] [444137.3]
2000 4395 1546.3 21704
[20564.6] [239537.7]
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 2. Distribution of relative subsidies and loans over years.
Year Subs/Out Subs/Out Subs/Out Loan/Out Loan/Out Loan/Out
if Loan=0 if Loan>0 if Subs=0 if Subs>0
1996 0.175 0.012 0.218 0.222 0.047 0.270
1997 0.018 0.026 0.011 0.065 0.078 0.059
1998 0.032 0.049 0.014 0.157 0.105 0.216
1999 0.042 0.052 0.031 0.271 0.251 0.299
2000 0.013 0.007 0.016 0.114 0.113 0.116
Note: Mean values are presented.
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Table 3. Description of the variables and sample statistics.
Variable Description Sample Subs>0 Subs=0 Loans>0 Loans=0
Costs per ruble of sales −0.010 −0.005∗∗∗ −0.015 −0.014 −0.005
Cost minus average value [0.241] [0.231] [0.250] [0.244] [0.239]
in the industry in the region
Log of real regional 3.997 4.010∗ 3.985 4.014∗∗∗ 3.979
Rsubn subsidies per worker [1.047] [1.030] [1.066] [1.058] [1.035]
in the region
Log of ratio −0.812 −0.381∗∗∗ −1.268 −0.665∗∗∗ −0.988
Size of Þrms employment to [1.370] [1.345] [1.240] [1.393] [1.317]
the regional employment
# of obs. 24365 12535 11830 12820 11373
Note: Mean values are given; standard errors are in parentheses. Stars denote statistical signiÞcance of
the diﬀerence in means between groups of Þrms distributed by the amount of subsidies or loans correspondingly at
1%(∗∗∗), 5%(∗∗), and 10%(∗) signiÞcance level.
Table 4. Distribution of number of Þrms by the amount of subsidy and amount of loan.
Year Subsidies Ratio: Subs>0/Subs=0 Loans Ratio: Loans>0/Loans=0
1996 373/99 368/98
1997 2222/1199 3883/3193
1998 2290/2593 2361/3243
1999 2273/3176 3142/3108
2000 2121/2274 2796/1731
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Table 5. Estimation results.
hypothesis 1 hypothesis 2 hypothesis 3
Dep.Variable I(Subs>0) Subs/Employment I(Loans>0)
Cost 0.392∗∗ 0.323
[0.178] [0.566]
Cost2 −0.222∗∗ −0.047
[0.097] [0.500]
Lag of Cost −0.735∗∗∗
[0.225]
d1996 0.758∗∗∗ 2.598∗∗∗
[0.193] [0.410]
d1997 0.837∗∗∗ 1.492∗∗∗ −0.653∗∗∗
[0.082] [0.224] [0.113]
d1998 0.063 0.656∗∗∗ −1.098∗∗∗
[0.071] [0.179] [0.095]
d1999 −0.266∗∗∗ 0.190 −0.965∗∗∗
[0.068] [0.152] [0.083]
Rsubn 0.018 −0.004
[0.042] [0.143]
Lag of Rsubn 0.109∗∗∗
[0.047]
Size 0.375∗∗∗ 0.593∗∗∗
[0.097] [0.106]
# of observations 7049 17199 6165
# of Þrms 2146 5778 1813
Note: Standard Errors are in parentheses.
Stars denote statistical signiÞcance at 1%(∗∗∗), 5%(∗∗) and 10%(∗) signiÞcance level.
Hypotheses 1 and 3 are estimated by conditional logit model with Þxed eﬀects.
Kyriazidou (1997) method is used to test Hypothesis 2.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
Let us suppose the contrast, i.e. ∃ θ1, θ2 : θ1 < θ2, e(θ1, eg, e0) ≤ e(θ2, eg, e0).
Then deÞnition of e(θ, eg, e0) implies(
π(e(θ1, eg, e0), eg, e0)−C(e(θ1, eg), θ1) ≥ π(e(θ2, eg, e0), eg, e0)− C(e(θ2, eg, e0), θ1)
π(e(θ2, eg, e0), eg, e0)−C(e(θ2, eg), θ2) ≥ π(e(θ1, eg), eg, e0)−C(e(θ1, eg, e0), θ2)
⇒ C(e(θ1, eg, e0), θ1) +C(e(θ2, eg, e0), θ2) ≤ C(e(θ2, eg, e0), θ1) +C(e(θ1, eg, e0), θ2)
⇒ ∂ (C(e, θ1)−C(e, θ2))
∂e
≤ 0
⇒ ∂
2C(e, θ)
∂e∂θ
≥ 0 - contradiction with single crossing conditions.¥
Proof of properties of border levels of eﬃciency.
In proofs we diﬀerentiate equations (14), (15), and (20) by eg, as they are identities by eg. We also use
the fact that
∂eg
∂α
< 0.
1)
∂θ12
∂α
< 0 (32)
Diﬀerentiating (14) by eg and using envelope theorem one gets:
−∂C(e
12
1 , θ12)
∂θ
∂θ12
∂eg
= (1− t)∂y2(eg)
∂e
− ∂C(eg, θ12)
∂eg
− ∂C(eg, θ12)
∂θ
∂θ12
∂eg
⇒ ∂θ12
∂eg
=
(1− t)∂y2(eg)∂e − ∂C(eg,θ12)∂e
∂C(eg,θ12)
∂θ − ∂C(e
12
1 ,θ12)
∂θ
(33)
Thus,
∂θ12
∂eg
> 0, as both parts of the ratio (33) are negative, what implies that (32) holds.¥
2)
∂θ24
∂α
(
> 0, for eg(α) < e∗3(θ34)
< 0, for eg(α) > e∗3(θ34)
(34)
Diﬀerentiating (15) by eg and using envelope theorem one gets:
−∂C(e
24
4 , θ24)
∂θ
∂θ24
∂eg
= (1− t)∂y2(eg)
∂e
− ∂C(eg, θ12)
∂θ
∂θ12
∂eg
(35)
⇒ ∂θ24
∂eg
=
(1− t)∂y2(eg)∂e − ∂C(eg,θ24)∂e
∂C(eg,θ24)
∂θ − ∂C(e
24
4 ,θ24)
∂θ
Therefore,
∂θ24
∂α
> 0 for eg < e∗3(θ34) and
∂θ24
∂α
< 0 for eg > e∗3(θ34) as denominator of the ratio in (35)
is positive and numerator is negative for eg > e∗3(θ34), what implies that (34) holds.¥
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3)
∂θ23
∂α
< 0 (36)
Diﬀerentiating (20) by eg one gets:
∂θ23
∂eg
=
(1− t)∂2y2(eg)∂e2 − ∂
2C(eg,θ23)
∂e2
∂2C(eg,θ23)
∂e∂θ
(37)
Thus,
∂θ23
∂eg
> 0, as both parts of the ratio (37) are negative, what implies that (36) holds.¥
Proof of properties of function B(α).
(a) Assumptions about technology infer that there are always Þrms that are self-repaying, and therefore
are Þnanced. Thus, taxes are always positive. Subsidies under no paternalism regime are zero. Consequently,
balance of payments under α = 0 is positive in period t = 1 .
(b) Denote the set of eﬃciency of Þnanced Þrms in the case of ability to have negative budget at pa-
ternalism level α as Φ(α). It follows from the presented analysis that θ ∈ Φ(α) ⇔ θ ≥ θ12(α). Consider
the case α > α∗. It follows from
∂θ12
∂α
< 0 that Φ(α) ⊃ Φ(α∗). If θ ∈ Φ(α∗) then according to Lemma 2
e(θ, eg(α), e0) ≤ e(θ, eg(α∗), e0). Since B(α∗) = 0 and B(0) > 0, at least some of the Þrms pay lower taxes
in t = 1, than the received subsidy. All the Þrms from the set Φ(α∗) exert not higher eﬀort under α, than
under α∗, and due to Lemma 1 added Þrms (θ ∈ Φ(α)\Φ(α∗)) exert eﬀort lower than eﬀort of any Þrm from
Φ(α∗). Consequently, Þrms from the subset Φ(α)\Φ(α∗) pay taxes lower than the subsidies they get, and
Þrms that belong to the set Φ(α∗) decrease the governments budget in t = 1. Thus, B(α) < 0 for α > α∗.
Formally, B(α∗) = 0⇒ y1(eg(α∗))−K < 0 and for all Þrms not belonging to Φ(α∗): e < eg(α∗). Denote
b(e(θ, eg(α), e0)) - the diﬀerence between taxes paid in period 1 by Þrm θ and a subsidy given to it. Thus,
B(α) =
∞Z
θ12(α∗)
(b(e(θ, eg(α), e0)) dF (θ) +
θ12(α
∗)Z
θ12(α)
(b(e(θ, eg(α), e0)) dF (θ) (38)
Due to Lemmas 1 and 2, and B(α∗) = 0, the Þrst intergral in (38) is negative. It also follows from
Lemmas 1 and 2 that the second integral in (38) is negative. Thus, B(α) < 0 for α > α∗. By analogy one
can show that Bα(α) < 0 for α > α∗.¥
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Proof of Proposition 3.
The proof is carried out in two steps. First, we prove that equilibrium strategies under α∗ compose
equilibrium under α > α∗. Second, we prove that this equilibrium is unique for α > α∗.
Step 1. The equilibrium under α∗ is an equilibrium under α > α∗. Actually, the government bails out
all the Þrms that are proÞtable for it, while it meets the liquidity constraint. B(α) = 0, as all Þnanced Þrms
exert e(θ, eg(α∗), e0). Thus, the governments strategy is an equilibrium one.
Exerting higher eﬀort any Þrm will lose. Only Þrms that under α∗ exerted eg(α∗) would reduce eﬀort,
if they were bailed out. But they wont, because deviation of a Þnanced Þrm to eﬀort lower than eg(α∗) at
α > α∗ implies negative balance of payment, if the government subsidize this Þrm. It also implies that this
Þrm is the least proÞtable to bail out. Thus, it would not be saved by the government. Consequently, Þrms
strategies are also equilibrium strategies.
It remained to show that the lenders are also rational. The lenders knowing that all the Þrms ∈ Φ(α∗)
repay, rationally Þnance them. They also know that the remained Þrms would never exert e ≥ eg(α∗), and
consequently they do not Þnance them, as B(α∗) = 0, and the government will not bail out Þrms that exert.
It is also not rational to switch Þnancing from some of the Þnanced Þrms (e.g. one with b(e(θ, eg(α), e0) < 0)
to Þrms with θ < θ12(α∗). Actually, all the Þrms with θ ≥ θ12(α∗) get oﬀers from at least two lenders in
equilibrium under α∗. Therefore, such a switch is not diﬀerent from simply Þnancing Þrms with θ < θ12(α∗).
Thus, the lenders behavior is also equilibrium one.
Step 2. Uniqueness of the equilibrium under α > α∗. Assume the opposite, and denote minimal eﬀort
exerted by a Þnanced Þrm as emin(α). If emin(α) > eg(α∗), then all the Þrms that belong to Φ
¡
e−1g (emin(α))
¢
(and only they) are Þnanced.41 In this case, the short-term balance of payments of the government is positive
and it is proÞtable to Þnance a Þrm ∈ Φ(α∗)\Φ ¡e−1g (emin(α))¢⇒ emin(α) ≤ eg(α∗). If emin(α) < eg(α∗)⇒
the budget is negative, as none of the Þrms /∈ Φ(α∗) exert e ≥ eg(α∗), and consequently all the Þrms ∈ Φ(α∗)
exert the same eﬀort as under α∗.42 Therefore, it is irrational to lend to Þrms /∈ Φ(α∗).
Thus, emin(α) = eg(α∗). Consequently, all the Þrms /∈ Φ(α∗) are not Þnanced, and all the Þrms ∈ Φ(α∗)
are. Moreover, the equilibrium strategy of all the Þrms ∈ Φ(α∗) is e(θ, eg(α∗), e0).¥
41Single-crossing condition infers that if a Þrm θ0 is Þnanced, then any Þrm with θ > θ0 should be Þnanced in the equilibrium,
because it will strictly beneÞt from repaying, and the lenders can get a rent by setting a contract (K+,K).
42Firms belonging to Φ(α∗) do not reduce eﬀorts with growth of α to keep the balance of payment of the government
non-negative, and correspondingly to be Þnanced (by analogy to discussion in step 1).
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